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COMBATING THIEVES OF VALOR: THE STOLEN VALOR ACT
OF 2013 IS CONSTITUTIONAL YET UNENFORCED
Mary E. Johnston*
INTRODUCTION
The first proponent of formidable stolen valor legislation, George Washington,
established the first “[h]onorary badges of distinction” for meritorious service in the
United States military, and he warned, “[s]hould any, who are not entitled to the honors,
have the insolence to assume the badges of them, they shall be severely punished.”1
A generation equipped with social media, smart phones, and such an unques-
tionable propensity to impersonate others that a new word had to be added to the
dictionary,2 has created the perfect atmosphere for exposing the growing epidemic
of stolen valor.3 “Stolen valor” is the term used to describe the occurrence of an indi-
vidual falsely representing him or herself as a decorated military service member in
an attempt to receive something of value for patriotic service that he or she never
completed.4 Contemporary society boasts a combination of effortless accessibility
of social media, smart phones capable of taking videos that can instantly be uploaded
to the Internet, and the availability of websites such as Amazon and eBay that both
sell military uniforms and awards, including an imitation of the U.S. Medal of Honor.5
* JD, William & Mary Law School, 2017; BS, The College of New Jersey, 2014. I would
like to thank my family and friends for their unconditional support and encouragement. Addi-
tionally, I would also like to thank the entire editorial board of the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal for the countless hours they have committed to diligently editing each note
and article in Volume 25.
1 JOHN WHITING, REVOLUTIONARY ORDERS OF GENERAL WASHINGTON 228 (Henry
Whiting ed., New York & London, Wiley & Putnam 1844).
2 Katy Steinmetz, #Selfie, Steampunk, Catfish: See This Year’s New Dictionary Words,
TIME (May 19, 2014), http://time.com/103503/merriam-webster-dictionary-selfie-catfish/
[https://perma.cc/H25Q-CBH8] (announcing the addition of the word “catfish” to the
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY to describe the phenomenon of online impersonation used
in online dating).
3 See generally B.G. BURKETT & GLENNA WHITLEY, STOLEN VALOR: HOW THE VIET-
NAM GENERATION WAS ROBBED OF ITS HEROES AND ITS HISTORY (1998) (establishing the
term “stolen valor” for the first time to describe the occurrences of military impersonation after
the Vietnam War).
4 The definition of stolen valor varies by each state depending on the state’s stolen valor
law. This Note will use the definition of “stolen valor” based on the federal Stolen Valor Act
of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I).
5 See Amazon Search for U.S. Military Uniform, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com
[https://perma.cc/BX26-SGES] (search starting point field for “U.S. Military Uniform”);
Ebay Search for U.S. Medal of Honor, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com [https://perma.cc/Q5FD
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This combination has culminated in both a growing number of people willing to
misrepresent themselves as war heroes as well as irate veterans willing to utilize
social media as a forum to expose the seemingly unpoliced problem of stolen valor.
Stolen valor occurs much more frequently than many people may realize. “The
number of stolen valor cases reported to the FBI has tripled in the last decade[,]”6
and the FBI has been cited for stating that for every “real Navy SEAL there are 300
imposters[,]”7 in addition to the fact that “for every one of the 120 Living Medal of
Honor Recipients, there are twice as many phonies.”8 Additionally, as of 2009, the
Department of Veteran Affairs paid disability benefits to more than 670 people falsely
claiming to have been prisoners of war in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.9 And,
“in a single year, more than 600 Virginia residents falsely claimed to have won the
Medal of Honor.”10 It has also been determined that there have been false claims of mil-
itary decorations incorporated into obituaries and even engraved on headstones of those
who never earned such high honors.11 Finally, YouTube has become a modern forum
for shaming those who engage in stolen valor. For example, the official “Stolen Valor”
YouTube page hosts over thirty videos that depict veterans exposing military imperson-
ators, and these videos have collectively garnered over thirty million views.12
The stolen valor epidemic captured the attention of over five million people on
Black Friday 2014 when an army veteran, Ryan Berk, approached Sean Yetman, who
was presenting himself as an elite Army Ranger while shopping at a mall and
-RTL5] (search starting point field for “US Medal of Honor.” Filter results by “Medals &
Ribbons” under categories on left side).
6 Restoring Valor, SKYHORSE PUB., http://skyhorsepublishing.com/titles/1135-9781626
365513-restoring-valor [https://perma.cc/J25P-56JB].
7 DOUG STERNER & PAT STERNER WITH MICHAEL MINK, RESTORING VALOR: ONE COU-
PLE’S MISSION TO EXPOSE FRAUDULENT WAR HEROES AND PROTECT AMERICA’S MILITARY
AWARDS SYSTEM 32 (2014) [hereinafter STERNER ET AL.].
8 Id.
9 See Allen G. Breed, AP: POW Benefit Claimants Exceed Recorded POWs, USA TODAY
(Apr. 12, 2009, 2:56 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2009-04-11-29
60821722_x.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZLY-6VUG] (“There are only 21 surviving POWs from
the first Gulf War in 1991, the Department of Defense says. Yet the Department of Veterans
Affairs is paying disability benefits to 286 service members it says were taken prisoner
during that conflict, according to data released by VA to The Associated Press. A similar
discrepancy arises with Vietnam POWs. Only 661 officially recognized prisoners returned
from that war alive—and about 100 of those have since died, according to Defense figures.
But 966 purported Vietnam POWs are getting disability payments, the VA told AP.”).
10 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2558 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
Edward Colimore, Pinning Crime on Fake Heroes: N.J. Agent Helps Expose and Convict
Those with Bogus U.S. Medals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 11, 2004, at A01).
11 STERNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 212 (citing John Crewdson, Claims of Medals Amount
to Stolen Valor, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 26, 2008, 1:53 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/chi-valor-oct25-story.html [https://perma.cc/BK2R-CDXD]).
12 Stolen Valor, YOUTUBE (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCGDj7
TypwdmUIR9K2Owki1g/about.
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allegedly receiving military discounts on his purchases.13 The three-minute YouTube
video depicts Berk, who had legitimately earned a Purple Heart for his service in
Afghanistan, using his iPhone to record his questioning of Yetman, who stumbled
over answers to simple questions regarding his current rank, duty station, and why his
uniform patches were either misplaced, missing, or impossible to have earned for his
age.14 According to the executive director of the National Infantry Association at Fort
Benning, Georgia, Yetman was not in the U.S. Army database that includes records
of all active duty, reservist, and recently retried soldiers, including Army Rangers.15
Specifically, one aspect of Yetman’s uniform—that Berk questioned him about—
constitutes a violation of the Stolen Valor Act of 2013. Yetman wore three Combat
Infantryman Badges (CIBs), which he claimed were awarded to him for his service in
Iraq and two different tours in Afghanistan.16 Yet, these badges actually represent that
he would have needed to personally fight in active combat in three different wars.17
This represents a violation of the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, which criminalizes mis-
representation of oneself as receiving one of a delineated list of honorary medals,
including the CIB, with the intent to obtain a tangible benefit.18 Yet, no criminal
charges have been brought against Yetman for his blatant public misrepresentation
that has been featured on social media and nearly every large news network.19
13 Stolen Valor, Veteran of 2/506th Calls Out Fake Ranger at Oxford Valley Mall,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOj07ClhEi8.
14 Id.; see also Hero Veteran Calls Out Fake Soldier on Video, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 2,
2014), http://video.foxnews.com/v/3919115724001/hero-veteran-calls-out-fake-soldier-on
-video/#sp=show-clips [https://perma.cc/3949-WYWZ] (depicting Berk explaining a service
member would need to serve in three different wars to earn some of Yetman’s badges).
15 Jo Ciavaglia, Man at Center of Stolen Valor Case Once Impersonated Dead Cop,
MORNING CALL (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-pa-fake
-army-ranger-impersonated-cop-in-2003-20141203-story.html [https://perma.cc/46DL-MTY5].
16 Stolen Valor, supra note 13.
17 U.S. Army, Combat Infantryman Badge, ARMY.MIL, http://www.army.mil/symbols
/CombatBadges/infantry.html [https://perma.cc/9P7F-4N6B].
18 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I) (“Whoever, with intent to obtain
money, property, or other tangible benefit, fraudulently holds oneself out to be a recipient
of a decoration or medal described in subsection (c)(2) or (d) shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than one year, or both. . . . (d) Enhanced Penalty for Offenses Involving
Certain Other Medals. . . . Combat badge defined. - In this subsection, the term ‘combat
badge’ means a Combat Infantryman’s Badge . . . .”).
19 See, e.g., Johnny Dodd, Military Posers Are ‘An Epidemic,’ Says Soldier Who Outs
Them, PEOPLE (Dec. 22, 2014, 10:10 AM), http://www.people.com/crime/military-posers-an
-epidemic-says-soldier-who-outs-them/ [https://perma.cc/76XQ-CHBG]; Kyle Jahner, Con-
gressman: Investigate Alleged Fake Ranger, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:32 AM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/04/fake-ranger-congressman-investigation
/19884179/ [https://perma.cc/6YUA-T3E4]; VIDEO: Vet Calls Out Man at Mall, Accuses Him
of Posing as Army Ranger, FOXNEWS INSIDER (Dec. 2, 2014, 8:37 AM), http://insider.fox
news.com/2014/12/02/video-army-vet-ryan-berk-angrily-calls-out-phony-army-ranger-penn
sylvania-mall [https://perma.cc/E2RQ-UQDF].
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Sean Yetman is by far not the worst case of stolen valor when compared to others
who have claimed to be recipients of more prestigious honors, such as the Medal of
Honor, America’s highest military honor, or others who have claimed to commit heroic
acts such as capturing Saddam Hussein,20 or being a member of the Navy SEAL
team that killed Osama Bin Laden.21 Even politicians, congressmen, and judges have
attempted to use false claims of admirable military service both to get elected and
to advance their careers.22
Congress initially attempted to combat stolen valor in 2005 by enacting The Stolen
Valor Act of 2005, which criminalized the act of lying about military service, either
verbally or in writing.23 That Act was deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Alvarez in 2012.24 Continuing to recognize both the legitimacy
of the problem and the need for an act to criminalize this deceptive behavior, in 2013
President Obama signed into law an amended version of the Stolen Valor Act.25 The
2013 Stolen Valor Act criminalizes the fraudulent acts of those who misrepresent them-
selves as recipients of certain prestigious military awards for the purposes of obtaining
“money, property, or other tangible benefit.”26 Specifically, the Act is limited to
misrepresentations about the Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, Air Force Cross, Silver
Star, Purple Heart, and combat badges.27
The problem is that, although the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is constitutional,
there have been only two arrests and prosecutions for fraudulent representation under
20 See STERNER ET AL., supra note 7, at xi, xiv (describing in detail how Gilbert Velasquez
misled his local paper to run a front page story detailing, among other false stories, how
Velasquez was the one who found Saddam Hussein in a pit in Tikrit, Iraq, and all of his ex-
tensive heroic and life-saving actions that allegedly led to him being awarded the Silver Star,
Distinguished Service Cross. Doug Sterner quickly determined that nearly every word of
Velasquez’s story “simply could not be true.”).
21 Matt Gutman, Chris Kilmer & Lauren Effron, Exposing a Navy SEAL Imposter: How
A.J. Dicken Was Found to Be a Fake, ABC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US
/exposing-navy-seal-imposter-aj-dicken-found-fake/story?id=21403794 [https://perma.cc
/MTE6-5RCU].
22 STERNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 14; Shaun Kenney, Gary McCollum’s Stolen Valor,
BEARING DRIFT (Sept. 18, 2015), http://bearingdrift.com/2015/09/18/gary-mccollums-stolen
-valor/ [https://perma.cc/75LN-7Y7F]; Ron Dickey, Mississippi Candidate for Congress Lies
About Being a Green Beret, GUARDIAN VALOR, http://guardianofvalor.com/ron-dickey-mis
sissippi-candidate-congress-lies-green-beret/ [https://perma.cc/LX7N-G68V].
23 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion), amended by Stolen Valor Act of 2013,
18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I).
24 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion).
25 Lee Ferran, Obama Signs Stolen Valor Act into Law, ABC NEWS (June 3, 2013), http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/06/obama-signs-stolen-valor-act-into-law/ [https://
perma.cc/J8NK-PU6K].
26 Id.
27 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (amending Stolen
Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006)).
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the new act, leaving a growing atmosphere of vigilante veterans exposing imposters
via YouTube and social media in an effort to substitute public shaming for legiti-
mate criminal penalties that should be enforced against this behavior.28 The U.S.
Supreme Court even seemed to endorse this behavior as an adequate remedy for
stolen valor by stating that “[the government] has not shown, and cannot show, why
counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”29 However, these veteran-
imposter encounters are increasingly leading to violence30 and instances of false
stolen valor accusations against actual veterans.31 For example, a false accusation
occurred in June 2015 when a police officer publicly humiliated a seventy-five-year-
old marine veteran in a false stolen valor confrontation.32 In response to this false
stolen valor incident, Doug Sterner, who is considered a stolen valor expert, told the
Washington Post, “‘[t]here is a vigilante mentality right now in a lot of these
veterans circles which is leading to—I just call it what it is . . .’ bullying.”33
Additionally, the lack of enforcement of the federal Act has led to twenty-two
states enacting or proposing legislation to take enforcement into their own hands.34
28 See Joshua Kellogg, Man Pleads Guilty to Stolen Valor Charge, FARMINGTON DAILY
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.daily-times.com/story/news/crime/2017/02/08/man-pleads
-guilty-stolen-valor-charge/97645398/ [https://perma.cc/A6PC-NZ78] (explaining the case
of a man who was under investigation for a firearms charge when he falsely stated to federal
agents that he was a combat veteran who previously received a purple heart); Janis Mara, San
Rafael Man Who Lied About Purple Heart Accepts Plea Deal, MARINIJ.COM (July 28, 2016),
http://www.marinij.com/article/NO/20160728/NEWS/160729799 [https://perma.cc/LH9Z
-ZLU6] (discussing a man who accepted a plea deal after using a fake Purple Heart to obtain
about $23,000 in donations for his business); see also U.S. Att’y’s Office S. Dist. of Iowa,
Davenport Man Sentenced for Stolen Valor Act Conviction, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdia/pr/davenport-man-sentenced-stolen-valor-act-conviction
[http://perma.cc/SZK9-QKNF] (discussing seventy-year-old man who pled guilty to a viola-
tion of the Stolen Valor Act where he purchased the Silver Star, Purple Heart, and CIB with-
out proper authorization, and was sentenced to five years probation and a $5,000 fine. This is a
separate part of the Act from subsection (b), which criminalizes false representation.).
29 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550.
30 Warner Todd Huston, Stolen Valor VIDEO: Man Pretending to Be a Navy SEAL Picks
the Wrong Guys to Scam—Two Army Rangers!, RIGHT WING NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://
rightwingnews.com/culture/stolen-valor-video-man-pretending-navy-seal-picks-wrong-guys
-scam-two-army-rangers/ [https://perma.cc/AN6T-2DFR] [hereinafter Man Pretending to Be
a Navy SEAL]; USMC Life, Fallujah Marine Veteran Beaten Over Mistaken Case of Stolen
Valor, USMC LIFE (Oct. 29, 2015), http://usmclife.com/2015/10/fallujah-marine-veteran
-beaten-over-mistaken-case-of-stolen-valor/ [https://perma.cc/F9JY-3TBE] [hereinafter Marine
Veteran Beaten].
31 Sarah Larimer, The Problem with Calling Out ‘Stolen Valor’: What if You’re Wrong?,
WASH. POST (June 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06
/05/the-problem-with-publicly-accusing-someone-of-stolen-valor-what-if-youre-wrong/
[https://perma.cc/WV5S-SMX5] [hereinafter The Problem with Calling Out].
32 Id.
33 Id. (quoting Doug Sterner).
34 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
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Recently, there has been a sharp increase among states passing these laws. Between
2014 and 2015, five state stolen valor laws were enacted; in 2016 one state enacted
a stolen valor law; and in 2015 eight states proposed stolen valor legislation.35 In
fact, some states are so serious about their commitment to taking up the slack of
federal enforcement against stolen valor that one state—New Jersey—has already
arrested a stolen valor offender on Veteran’s Day 2015, less than one month after
its stolen valor law was passed, and his case is currently pending.36
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the current fraudulent representation
section of the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 under two different interpretations: an act
criminalizing fraud and an act limiting commercial speech. Further, this Note proposes
solutions to the current non-enforcement of the federal Act by suggesting: (1) that
the current Stolen Valor Act of 2013 be redrafted to mirror the current federal
criminal impersonation statute utilized to prosecute police impersonation; or (2) the
federal Act be redrafted to mirror one of the constitutional state stolen valor laws
that allows for more effective enforcement.
I. HISTORY OF STOLEN VALOR
A. History of the First Amendment and False Statements
The iconic text of the First Amendment resounds that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]”37 In accordance with the words of the
First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court subjects any government action that seeks
to regulate or restrict speech based on its content to the highest possible standard of
review—strict scrutiny.38
However, the protection of the First Amendment is not absolute because “the
First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.”39 Although the U.S. Su-
preme Court has found that “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid[,]”40
the Court has also upheld certain content-based restrictions on speech, which are “of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”41 These limited
categories of speech that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment include
35 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
36 POLICE: NJ Man Impersonated Soldier on Veterans Day, 6ABC (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://6abc.com/news/police-nj-man-impersonated-soldier-on-veterans-day/1080993/
[https://perma.cc/R3H8-3CCR] [hereinafter NJ Impersonation].
37 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
39 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
40 R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)).
41 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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the following: incitement,42 obscenity,43 defamation,44 speech integral to criminal con-
duct,45 fighting words,46 child pornography,47 true threats,48 “speech presenting some
grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent,”49 and fraud.50
In addition to these limited categories, “[t]ime and again, [the U.S. Supreme]
Court has recognized that as a general matter false factual statements possess no
intrinsic First Amendment value.”51 Indeed, America has a long history of crimi-
nalizing false statements of fact, as noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.52:
10 of the 14 States that had ratified the Constitution by 1792 had
themselves provided constitutional guarantees for free expres-
sion, and 13 of the 14 nevertheless provided for the prosecution
of libels. Prior to the Revolution, the American Colonies had
adopted the common law of libel. . . . Seditious libel was pun-
ished as a contempt by the colonial legislatures and as a criminal
offense in the colonial courts.53
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court’s history of finding that false statements of fact
exist outside of the protection of the First Amendment arguably began in 1919 with
42 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
43 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 476;
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
44 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
45 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253.
46 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
47 See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
48 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
49 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536
U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (“[F]alse statements may be unprotected for their own sake.”); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are particularly
valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they
cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech,
however persuasive or effective” (citation omitted)); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“There is ‘no constitutional value in false statements of fact.’” (citation
omitted)); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“[F]alse statements
are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”); Va. State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.” (citations omitted))).
52 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
53 Id. at 380–81 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957)).
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Schenck v. United States,54 where the Court, and specifically Justice Holmes, famously
determined that even “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.”55 In other words,
the First Amendment would not protect someone shouting a false statement that
created a “clear and present danger.”56
Next, in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,57 the Court reasoned that freedom
of speech
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words.58
In this case, the Court listed libel, or false speech that wrongly defames a
person’s reputation, as a category of unprotected speech.59
Later, in 1964, the Court further expanded the exception for libelous speech in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan60 and Garrison v. Louisiana,61 two cases involving
the defamation of public figures.62 In New York Times Co., the Court emphasized
that “erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free debate, and that [they] must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
‘need . . . to survive.’”63 Based on this reasoning, the Court held that for a public
official to successfully recover in a defamation or libel claim, that public figure must
“prove[ ] that the statement was made with ‘actual malice[,]’ . . . [meaning] knowl-
edge that it was false or [made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”64
Within the same year as New York Times Co., the Court also decided Garrison v.
54 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
55 Id. at 52.
56 Id.; see also United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although
Schenck was concerned with seditious speech, it is particularly instructive here, given that
the ‘clear and present danger’ test emerged from the ‘fire in a theater’ hypothetical, which
is quintessentially about a false statement of fact.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) (plurality opinion).
57 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
58 Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted).
59 Id.
60 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
62 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67; New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256.
63 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
64 Id. at 279–80.
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Louisiana, in which the Court extended the “actual malice” requirement to criminal
defamation statutes, and reasoned that “the use of the known lie as a tool is at once
at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner
in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.”65
Ten years later, in 1974, the Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,66 which
involved defamation through false statements about private individuals.67 In Gertz,
although the Court determined that the “actual malice” requirement utilized for pub-
lic figures would not be extended to the cases of defamation of private individuals,68
the Court did reason that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact[,]”69 and that “the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection.”70 The Court reasoned that it needed to “protect some falsehood in order
to protect speech that matters[,]”71 but it found that the “false statements of fact” in
that case were not protected by the First Amendment because defaming lies have
such low societal value that “[t]hey belong to that category of utterances which ‘are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.’”72
The Court’s finding of slight societal value, and therefore little need for First
Amendment protection, continued to be referenced throughout later libel cases. For
example, in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,73 the Court stated “false state-
ments are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.”74
And, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,75 the Court reasoned that “[f]alse state-
ments of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function
of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that
cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”76
65 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75.
66 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
67 Id. at 325.
68 Id. at 342–43.
69 Id. at 340. “Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances so-
ciety’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues. They belong
to that category of utterances which ‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” Id. (citations omitted).
70 Id.; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1051 (3d ed. 2006) (“A public figure can recover for defamation only by meeting the New
York Times standard; . . . a private figure can recover compensatory damages for defamation
by proving falsity of the statement and negligence.”).
71 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
72 Id. at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
73 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
74 Id. at 743 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340).
75 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
76 Id. at 52 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340, 344 n.9).
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In addition to false statements that are defamatory in nature, fraudulent speech
also has been repeatedly cited by the Court as being among the “narrowly defined”
categories of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment.77
Although the foregoing U.S. Supreme Court precedent tended to show a trend
of not extending First Amendment protection to purely false statements, this trajec-
tory changed abruptly when the Court decided United States v. Alvarez in 2012.78
B. Stolen Valor Act of 2005
Prior to the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, it was only a crime to physically wear an
unearned medal of valor.79 In response to a growing number of cases where law
enforcement was powerless to prosecute unless an individual was physically wearing
a medal,80 Congress unanimously passed the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.81 This Act
represented an initial attempt to safeguard the legitimacy of the U.S. Military’s
awards for true valor. The controversial portions of the Act read as follows:
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS
OR MEDALS. Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, ver-
bally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United
States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to the mem-
bers of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such
badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such
item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.82
77 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (“[Congress’s
power] to protect people against fraud . . . has always been recognized in this country and is
firmly established.”); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (“Frauds may be de-
nounced as offenses and punished by law.”).
78 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556–57 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
79 STERNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 47.
80 Id. at 176. In one particularly disturbing case, Doug Sterner described in his book how
District Judge Michael O’Brien prominently displayed “two Medals of Honor . . . in a frame
on the wall of his courtroom” and “would quickly tell anyone who asked that he had earned
both during his service in Vietnam.” Id. at 14. Because this happened before the passage of
the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, “under existing law, [Judge O’Brien] was in violation of no
statute that could remove him [from the bench] or otherwise punish him for his act of stolen
valor.” Id.
81 Id. at 35, 37.
82 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006), invalidated by United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion), amended by Stolen Valor Act of 2013,
18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
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C. United States v. Alvarez—“The Constitutional Right to Lie”83
“I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same
guy. I’m still around.”84
This is how Xavier Alvarez introduced himself on July 23, 2007, at a board
meeting shortly after being elected to serve as the Director of the Three Valley
Water District Board.85 However, Alvarez never served one day in the military as
a marine, or as an active duty service member in any of the branches of the U.S. Armed
forces.86 Therefore, he was never even eligible to earn the Congressional Medal of
Honor. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “with the exception of ‘I’m still around,’ his
self-introduction was nothing but a series of bizarre lies”87 and that “Alvarez makes
a hobby of lying about himself to make people think he is ‘a psycho from a mental
ward with Rambo stories.’”88
After the FBI obtained a recording of the Water District Board Meeting, Alvarez
was indicted on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c)(1) (2006) for “falsely rep-
resent[ing] verbally that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor when,
in truth and as [he] knew, he had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor.”89
Strikingly, Alvarez was the first person, as of 2010, to be charged and convicted
under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.90
Alvarez pled guilty and reserved his right to appeal the First Amendment ques-
tion.91 Alvarez appealed the constitutional issue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which held that the Stolen Valor Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) and
(c) were “facially invalid under the First Amendment, and [were] unconstitutionally
83 STERNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 176.
84 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Xavier Alvarez),
aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1200–01.
87 Id. at 1201.
88 Id. “Alvarez [said] that he won the Medal of Honor for rescuing the American Am-
bassador during the Iranian hostage crisis, and that he had been shot in the back as he
returned to the embassy to save the American flag. . . . [He] reportedly told another woman
that he was a Vietnam veteran helicopter pilot who had been shot down but then, with the
help of his buddies, was able to get the chopper back into the sky. . . . Alvarez has [also]
claimed to have played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings, to have worked as a police officer
(who was fired for using excessive force), and to have been secretly married to a Mexican
starlet.” Id.
89 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
90 Id. (showing that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was rarely enforced, similar to the cur-
rent 2013 Act).
91 Id.
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applied to make a criminal out of a man who was proven to be nothing more than a
liar.”92 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and published a plurality opinion.93
1. Plurality Opinion—Justice Kennedy
Authoring the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy held that the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005 constituted an unconstitutional content-based restriction on free speech.94
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that although the Court had previously reasoned, for
example, that “‘false statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they inter-
fere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas’ and that false
statements ‘are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful
statements,’” that did not lead to the conclusion that intentional false statements are
unequivocally unprotected by the First Amendment.95 Justice Kennedy stated that
those previous quotations from the Court, which appear to imply a lessened form of
constitutional protection for false statements, “all derive from cases discussing defama-
tion, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement,”
and “[i]n those decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not . . . determinative”
to the Court’s analysis.96 Justice Kennedy also looked to “permissible” federal stat-
utes that criminalize false speech, including: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), which prohibits
false statements made to the government; 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012), and its state-law
equivalents, prohibiting perjury; 18 U.S.C. § 709 (2012), which punishes false represen-
tations that one is speaking on behalf of the government; and 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012),
which criminalizes misrepresentations that an individual is an officer of the govern-
ment.97 He found that each of these statutes had aspects that made their application
sufficiently narrower than the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.98 For example, Justice
Kennedy focused on the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was limited only to false statements
to “Government officials, in communications concerning official matters,” perjury laws
prohibit false statements made under oath, and “[s]tatutes that prohibit falsely represent-
ing that one is speaking on behalf of the Government, or that prohibit impersonating
a Government officer . . . protect the integrity of the Government processes.”99
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy found the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 unconstitu-
tional because it failed to pass the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis,100 which requires
that a law “is justified by a compelling government interest[,] . . . is narrowly drawn
92 Id. at 1217.
93 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2541.
94 Id. at 2543.
95 Id. at 2545 (first quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); then
quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2545–46.
98 See id. at 2546.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 2549–51.
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to serve that interest[,] . . . and the curtailment of free speech [is] actually necessary
to the solution.”101 Justice Kennedy determined that the Act failed this analysis for
two reasons.102 First, the Stolen Valor Act did not possess a sufficient causal link
between the “Government’s compelling interest” in “protecting the integrity of the
military honors system and the Act’s restriction on the false claims of liars” to prove
that the law was “actually necessary.”103 This is because the Government provided “no
evidence to support its claim that the public’s general perception of military awards
is diluted by false claims, such as those made by Alvarez.”104 Second, furthering the
Court’s finding that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was not “actually necessary,” the
Government also failed to prove that “counterspeech” and public outrage in reaction
to false statements of military valor “would not suffice to achieve [the Government’s
compelling] interest” in protecting the integrity of America’s military awards.105
Despite the fact that Justice Kennedy found the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 uncon-
stitutional, his plurality opinion implied that the law could be amended to fix its uncon-
stitutional breadth.106 Specifically, Justice Kennedy found that the fatal flaw of the
Act was that it “applie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any
person. . . . And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the
purpose of material gain.”107 He continued that “[w]here false claims are made to effect
a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say offers of employment,
it is well established that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the
First Amendment.”108 With this line of reasoning, Justice Kennedy was suggesting
that the Act would be constitutional if it had focused on limiting fraudulent speech.
2. Concurring Opinion—Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer drew an analogy between stolen valor and trademark infringe-
ment109—reasoning that “[t]rademarks identify the source of a good; and infringe-
ment causes harm by causing confusion among potential customers (about the source)
and thereby diluting the value of the mark to its owner, to consumers, and to the
economy.”110 And comparatively, “a false claim of possession of a medal or other
honor creates confusion about who is entitled to wear it, thus diluting its value to
those who have earned it, to their families, and to their country.”111 However, trademark
101 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citation omitted).
102 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2549–51.
103 Id. at 2549.
104 Id. (citation omitted).
105 Id.
106 See id. at 2547.
107 Id. (citation omitted).
108 Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976)).
109 Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
110 Id.
111 Id.
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statutes require a proof of injury that “narrow[s] the statute to a subset of lies where
specific harm is more likely to occur[,]”112 thereby distinguishing them from the Stolen
Valor Act of 2005, which Justice Breyer found to “lack[] any such limiting features.”113
Justice Breyer was concerned that the Act was written so broadly that it could
apply to virtually any context including private or political settings. Additionally,
because so many military awards were covered under the Act, Breyer reasoned that
an individual could make a careless, unintentional, false statement and still be held
liable for it.114 As a proposed solution, Breyer called on Congress to create a “more
finely tailored statute” by narrowing the scope of the Act to apply to a limited
amount of military awards that “warrant greater protection than others[,]” and to
limit the application of the Act to instances where false statements caused specific
or material harm, “or [to] contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.”115
Thus, because the Act lacked these limiting features, Justice Breyer found the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 unconstitutional and unable to satisfy even intermediate
scrutiny.116
3. Dissenting Opinion—Justice Alito
Justice Alito began his powerful dissent by stating:
Only the bravest of the brave are awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor, but the Court today holds that every American
has a constitutional right to claim to have received this singular
award. The Court strikes down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005,
which was enacted to stem an epidemic of false claims about mili-
tary decorations. These lies, Congress reasonably concluded, were
undermining our country’s system of military honors and inflict-
ing real harm on actual medal recipients and their families.117
Justice Alito further explained that this decision illustrates a departure from the
Court’s repeated reasoning and holdings that “the right to free speech does not protect
false factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no legitimate interest.”118
112 Id. at 2555.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2556.
116 Id. Justice Breyer applied intermediate scrutiny because “false factual statements are
less likely than are true factual statements to make a valuable contribution to the marketplace
of ideas. And the government often has good reasons to prohibit such false speech.” Id. at
2552 (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 2557.
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Justice Alito further pointed out five limits the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 pos-
sessed119 despite the other Justices’ findings to the contrary. These limits included:
(1) it applied only to the narrow category of false statements about “objective facts that
can almost always be proved or disproved with near certainty[;]” (2) it concerned “facts
that [were] squarely within the speaker’s personal knowledge[;]” (3) a conviction under
the Act would require a showing of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker
actually knew that the representation was false[;]” (4) the Act does not apply to
“dramatic performances, satire, parody, hyperbole,” etc.; and (5) the Act is viewpoint
neutral because it “applies equally to all false statements, whether they tend to dispar-
age or commend the Government, the military, or the system of military honors.”120
Justice Alito further drew an analogy between the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 and
trademark law by stating that much like the existence of “cheap imitations of luxury
goods” confuses purchasers of the originals, “the proliferation of false claims about
military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by making them
seem more common than they really are, and this diluting effect harms the military
by hampering its efforts to foster morale.”121 He continued that “[s]urely it was
reasonable for Congress to conclude that the goal of preserving the integrity of our
country’s top military honors is at least as worthy as that of protecting the prestige
associated with fancy watches and designer handbags.”122
Justice Alito further attacked the plurality and concurrence by finding that they
are essentially claiming that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was overbroad.123 Yet, “to
strike down a statute on the basis that it is overbroad, it is necessary to show that the
statute’s ‘overbreadth [is] substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative
to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.’”124
Justice Alito bolstered his dissent by referencing the fact that “there are more
than 100 federal criminal statutes that punish false statements made in connection
with areas of federal agency concern.”125 Based on a combination of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, the existence of such a significant amount of federal criminal stat-
utes and the fact that “the Stolen Valor Act presents no risk at all that valuable speech
will be suppressed[,]” Alito concluded that the Act should have been upheld.126
D. Stolen Valor Act of 2013
Due to the ongoing recognition of the need for an act to criminalize stolen valor,
Congress passed the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 within a year of the U.S. Supreme
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2559.
122 Id. (citation omitted).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 2564 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)).
125 Id. at 2562 (citing United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505–07 & nn.8–10 (1997)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
126 Id. at 2564.
1370 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1355
Court decision in Alvarez.127 Below is the amended text of the fraudulent representa-
tion section of the Act:
(b) FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILI-
TARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS.—Whoever, with intent to obtain
money, property, or other tangible benefit, fraudulently holds one-
self out to be a recipient of a decoration or medal described in
subsection (c)(2) or (d) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.128
E. State Stolen Valor Laws
As a result of the under-enforced federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013, twenty-two
states currently have enacted, or have pending, legislation criminalizing various
forms of military impersonation.129 Two states in particular have passed stolen valor
legislation that both criminalizes a wider range of conduct and applies stronger
penalties than the federal Act—New Jersey and Massachusetts.130 Further, although
state stolen valor laws vary among the states and are not identical to the federal
Stolen Valor Act, most are effectively mirrored after it in criminalizing similar be-
havior in a similar manner.131 Therefore, the constitutional framework provided in
127 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
128 Id. (Subsections (c) and (d) omitted—these subsections describe that the protected
medals are the Congressional Medal of Honor, the distinguished-service cross, the Navy cross,
the Air Force cross, the silver star, the Purple Heart, a combat badge, “or any replacement
or duplicate medal for such medal as authorized by law”).
129 ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.5 (2016); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3003 (West 2016); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-378 (West 2016); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 907C (West 2016); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 817.312 (West 2016); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1805/101 (West 2016); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-5-22 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.444 (West 2016); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 354 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 106 (West 2016);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.350 (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.412 (West 2015); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 38A:14-5 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 6-1 (West 2016); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-17-760 (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.54 (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.78 (West 2016). Proposed legislation: H.B. 1466, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2017); H.B. 4020, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013); S.B. 5201, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2015); A.B. 7244, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); A.B. 8154, 238th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2015); S.B. 43, 199th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); H.B. 5999, 2015
Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2015); H.B. 2015, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
130 See supra Section III.B for discussion.
131 See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10.5 (2016); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3003 (West 2016); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-378 (West 2016); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 907C (West 2016); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 817.312 (West 2016); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1805/101 (West 2016); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.444 (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 354 (2016);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 106 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.350 (West
2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.412 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:14-5 (West
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this Note will be applicable to any future constitutional challenge to a state stolen
valor law.
II. THE STOLEN VALOR ACT OF 2013 IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN ANALYZED AS
EITHER CRIMINALIZING FRAUDULENT SPEECH OR LIMITING FALSE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH, YET THE ACT REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNENFORCED BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND IS LEFT TO BE POLICED BY PUBLIC SHAMING
A. The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 Is Constitutional
The current Stolen Valor Act is constitutional under two different interpreta-
tions. First, and primarily, the Act can be viewed as criminalizing fraudulent speech,
which has consistently been held to be a category of speech outside of the protection
of the First Amendment.132 Second, when an individual commits stolen valor by
making false claims of “battlefield bravery,” it can be construed as a form of self-
promotional commercial speech utilized for the purpose of economic gain, thereby
qualifying the Act for a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny.
1. Stolen Valor Act of 2013 & United States v. Swisher
In addition to the Act’s controversial fraudulent representation section, the con-
stitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005's general subsection (a)133 has also been
challenged. For example, a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Swisher,134
held the 2005 version of 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) unconstitutional due to its prohibition
of the mere wearing of “any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the
armed forces of the United States.”135 The rationale the Ninth Circuit adopted in this
case was that this section of the statute constituted a content-based restriction of
speech that could not survive strict scrutiny due to the availability of less restrictive
means for the government to meet its compelling objective.136 However, the 2013
version of the Act removed the word “wears” from subsection (a) and now only
criminalizes the actions of an individual who intentionally “purchases, attempts to
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-760 (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.54 (West 2015); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 946.78 (West 2016).
132 See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.” (citation omitted)); Donaldson v. Read Maga-
zine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (explaining that the government’s power “to protect people
against fraud” has “always been recognized in this country and is firmly established”).
133 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion), amended by Stolen Valor Act of 2013
18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I 2013).
134 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016).
135 Id. at 303 n.1.
136 Id. at 317.
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purchase, solicits for purchase, mails, ships, imports, exports, produces blank certifi-
cates of receipt for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale, trades,
barters, or exchanges” any officially authorized military medal.137 This amendment
to subsection (a) makes the subsection analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012) which
criminalizes the action of anyone who
knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without
authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any . . . thing of value of
the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
property made or being made under contract for the United
States or any department or agency. . . .138
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 641 has been consistently found to be constitutional.139
Because 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) has been the more litigated and controversial sub-
section, this Note will focus on the constitutionality of subsection (b).
2. Stolen Valor Act of 2013 Construed as Limiting Fraudulent Speech
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that since its enactment in 1791,
“the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas[,]’” “including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct . . . ‘the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem.’”140 Justice Kennedy further em-
phasized that fraud remains a category of unprotected speech in the plurality opinion
of Alvarez by stating that “[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure
moneys or other valuable considerations, [such as] offers of employment, it is well
established that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First
137 18 U.S.C. § 704(a). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged this amendment to the Stolen
Valor Act in their Swisher Opinion. Swisher, 811 F.3d at 304 (“§ 704(a) was amended to
remove the word ‘wears’ from the list of prohibited actions with respect to decorations and
medals authorized by Congress. That is, § 704(a) no longer prohibits the conduct for which
Swisher was convicted. Because Swisher was convicted under the prior version of the statute,
however, the case is not moot.” (citations omitted)).
138 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012); see also Bernhardt v. United States, 169 F.2d 983, 984 (6th
Cir. 1948) (per curiam) (affirming defendant’s convictions for stealing “property purchased
for the military or naval service” pursuant to the former version of this statute); Horowitz v.
United States, 262 F. 48 (2d Cir. 1919) (holding that the unlawful selling of cloth “intended
for use in making [clothing] for the military or naval service” fell within the statute), cert.
denied, 252 U.S. 586 (1920).
139 See, e.g., United States v. McAusland, 979 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Jones, 677 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
140 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
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Amendment.”141 Accordingly, the current Stolen Valor Act of 2013 now constitution-
ally regulates fraudulent speech and behavior, which has long been held to fall within
one of the categories “historically unprotected” by the First Amendment.142
In Alvarez, both Justice Kennedy, in the plurality opinion, and Justice Breyer,
in the concurring opinion, suggested that a more finely tailored Stolen Valor Act
would be able to pass constitutional muster.143 These suggestions culminated in the
carefully drafted Stolen Valor Act of 2013, which narrowly criminalizes the behav-
ior of individuals who fraudulently misrepresent receipt of specific military honors
in an attempt to obtain financial or tangible gain.144 The fundamental change to the
Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is the completely redrafted subsection (b), which now reads:
“Whoever, with intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit, fraudu-
lently holds oneself out to be a recipient of a decoration or medal described in
subsection (c)(2) or (d) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.”145
This revised subsection makes it clear that the Act no longer criminalizes “[w]ho-
ever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded
any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United
States” as the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 did.146 The 2013 Act is more narrowly tai-
lored to protect the government’s interest in safeguarding the integrity of America’s
highest awards for military valor.147
A single definition of fraud has been debated among the courts as both the U.S.
Supreme Court and circuit courts have defined fraud differently when referring to
either the entire category of fraud or a specific type of fraud.148 For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court has broadly reasoned that “[f]raud connotes perjury, falsifica-
tion, concealment, [and] misrepresentation.”149 In contrast, when considering a spe-
cific type of fraud, such as securities fraud, the Court has required the proof of many
specific elements such as “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the de-
fendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
141 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).
142 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
143 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547; id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
144 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
145 Id. (emphasis added).
146 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I 2013).
147 Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I 2013) (criminalizing the fraudulent mis-
representation of only the delineated military awards referenced supra note 128).
148 See Natali Wyson, Defining Fraud as an Unprotected Category of Speech: Why the Ninth
Circuit Should Have Upheld the Stolen Valor Act in United States v. Alvarez, 2012 BYU L. REV.
671, 675–76. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001–40 (2012) (“Fraud and False Statements”).
149 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946).
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omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”150 Additionally, fraud is generally
considered against the backdrop of the common-law tort of fraud, the exact elements
of which vary from state to state.151 The generally required elements are that some-
one (1) make a false representation, (2) with the intention of either making someone
act or refrain from acting in reliance upon that representation, (3) and that person
reasonably relied on the representation and it did induce the desired action or inaction,
and (4) this resulted in pecuniary loss or damage to the listener.152
Further, impersonation or false personation statutes are generally considered to
constitute a subsection of the broader category of fraud153 and are “drafted to apply
narrowly to conduct performed in order to obtain, at a cost to another, a benefit to
which one is not entitled.”154 For example, consider the federal false personation
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012), which states that
[w]hoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or
employee acting under the authority of the United States or any
department, agency, or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in
such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper,
document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned . . . .155
In United States v. Lepowitch,156 the Court considered a case regarding the former
version of 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012), titled 18 U.S.C. § 76 (1940), which contained simi-
lar statutory language.157 In that case the Court determined that the impersonation
150 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
151 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place
of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1067 n.20 (2006) (indicating varying elements
in different jurisdictions).
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 9 (AM. LAW
INST. 2014).
153 See People v. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d 340, 343 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[B]y its
nature, the charge of criminal impersonation involves fraud and dishonesty, because assuming
a false or fictitious identity or capacity is equivalent to lying about one’s identity or status.”
(emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010); State v. Oliver, 456
N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1982) (“The gist of the various crimes of impersonating pro-
scribed by [statute] . . . is the fraud of making a person believe that the actor enjoys a certain
status or identity other than that which he, in actuality, possesses.” (emphasis added)); see also
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 2016) (“Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud. Article 190.
Other Frauds. § 190.25 Criminal impersonation in the second degree.”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-177.1 (West 2016) (“Chapter 6. Crimes Involving Fraud. Article 2. Impersonation.”).
154 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
155 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012).
156 318 U.S. 702 (1943).
157 Id. at 703 n.1 (“Falsely pretending to be United States officer. Whoever with intent to de-
fraud either the United States or any person, shall falsely assume or pretend to be an officer
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statute contained two elements: (1) the “impersonation of an officer of the govern-
ment” and (2) “acting as such with intent to defraud either the United States or any
person.”158 The Court further defined the phrase “intent to defraud” by reasoning
that this element “do[es] not require more than that the defendants have, by artifice
and deceit, sought to cause the deceived person to follow some course he would not
have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.”159
The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 most closely resembles an impersonation statute
similar to the federal criminal impersonation statute discussed above, 18 U.S.C.
§ 912.160 The current federal impersonation statute “defines two separate and distinct
offenses. The offenses are impersonation coupled with acting as such and imperson-
ation coupled with demanding or obtaining something of value in such pretended
character. False personation of an officer or employee of the United States is an ele-
ment of both offenses.”161 The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is most closely analogous to
the second of those offenses, which contains two elements: (1) “falsely assum[ing]
or pretend[ing] to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United
States or any department, agency or officer thereof,” (2) and “in such pretended char-
acter demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value.”162 The
Stolen Valor Act of 2013 satisfies these elements. First, the Stolen Valor Act fulfills
the first element by requiring the offender “fraudulently holds oneself out to be a
recipient” of the narrowly defined list of America’s highest military awards for valor,
as opposed to impersonation of a government officer.163 With regard to the second
element, 18 U.S.C. § 912 requires the offender must “demand[ ] or obtain[ ] any
or employee acting under the authority of the United States, or any department, or any officer
of the Government thereof, or under the authority of any corporation owned or controlled by
the United States, and shall take upon himself to act as such, or shall in such pretended char-
acter demand or obtain from any person or from the United States, or any department, or any
officer of the Government thereof, or any corporation owned or controlled by the United
States, any money, paper, document, or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 76 (1940)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 912))).
158 Id. at 703 (“They were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 76, the first branch of which includes
two elements: impersonation of an officer of the government and acting as such with intent
to defraud either the United States or any person.”).
159 Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
160 18 U.S.C. § 912 (“Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee
acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof,
and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, docu-
ment, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.”).
161 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1470 (1997), http://
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1470-false-personation-elements-offenses
[https://perma.cc/33GU-AYGM] [hereinafter USAM].
162 18 U.S.C. § 912.
163 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I).
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money, paper, document, or thing of value,”164 whereas the Stolen Valor Act requires
the offender must make the requisite misrepresentations “with intent to obtain money,
property, or other tangible benefit.”165 The Stolen Valor Act’s requirements are con-
sistent with the federal criminal impersonation statute’s second element that an
offender can be liable for demanding the acquisition of a tangible benefit, meaning
that the offender does not have to successfully obtain the benefit but merely seek to
obtain it, much like the Stolen Valor Act’s language that the offender must intend
to obtain an economic or tangible benefit.166
However, it may be argued that the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is not a constitu-
tional fraud statute because it does not include the common-law fraud elements of
actual reliance and injury stemming from the requisite misrepresentations.167 This
argument fails because not every constitutionally valid fraud statute contains these
elements, and none of the fraudulent impersonation statutes contain these elements.168
For example, the federal statutes which criminalize both mail and bank fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), respectively, do not require that
the intended victim suffer actual harm; rather, the mere act of attempting the intentional
misrepresentation is the criminalized fraudulent act.169 Additionally, in order for the
government to prove perjury, one of the most central cases of fraud, the government is
only required to prove: “(1) that [the defendant] testified under oath about certain ma-
terial matters; (2) that the testimony was false; (3) that . . . [the defendant] knew such
testimony was false; and (4) that [the defendant] voluntarily and intentionally gave the
testimony.”170 Crucially, the government is not required to show that the false testimony
caused any harm to an ongoing investigation or the proceedings at issue.171 Finally,
164 18 U.S.C. § 912.
165 18 U.S.C. § 704.
166 See 18 U.S.C. § 704; 18 U.S.C. § 912.
167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM, supra note
152, § 9 (laying out the common-law fraud elements).
168 See 18 U.S.C. § 912; USAM, supra note 161 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 912, “[i]t is the
view of the Criminal Division, however, that there is no such reliance requirement inherent
in the statute” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (federal impersonation statute);
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (federal fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (federal bank fraud
statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-8 (West 2016) (impersonation statute); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-174 (West 2016) (impersonation statute).
169 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 18 U.S.C. § 1344; see also United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197,
1212 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) [bank fraud], the government must prove
that: (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to
defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant had the intent to defraud a financial institu-
tion; and (3) the bank involved was federally insured.” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The intended victim need not have been
actually defrauded in order for a mail fraud violation to have occurred.”).
170 United States v. Swink, 21 F.3d 852, 857 (1994).
171 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 402 n.1 (1998) (“The
government need not show that because of the perjured testimony, the grand jury threw in
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and most applicable to the analogy in this Section, the U.S. Department of Justice,
United States Attorneys’ Manual explains that with regard to the federal False Per-
sonation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 912,
action alone may amount to a false pretense of federal author-
ity. . . . It has been held that evidence of reliance by the intended
victim is admissible because reliance is an essential element of
the offense. Haid v. United States, 157 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir.
1946). This conclusion seems to originate from a misinterpreta-
tion of United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915) . . . .
Obviously, in cases under 18 U.S.C. § 912 in which a thing of
value has been obtained, reliance by the victim is almost always
provable. It is the view of the Criminal Division, however, that
there is no such reliance requirement inherent in the statute. See
Levine v. United States, 261 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1957).172
Thus, these statutes illustrate that a statute criminalizing misrepresentations can be
constitutionally valid without including all of the traditional elements of common-
law fraud.
Overall, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is constitutional as it criminalizes imperson-
ation advancing the fraudulent intent of obtaining “money, paper, document, or thing
of value,” which is a subcategory of fraud.173 This statute falls under the imperson-
ation subcategory of the broad category of fraud,174 which has been historically
unprotected by the First Amendment. Additionally, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 has
elements analogous to the federal criminal false personation statute that has been
consistently upheld as constitutional.175 Therefore, the misrepresentations crimi-
nalized by the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 are not protected by the First Amendment
and can be constitutionally restricted.
the towel. . . . Grand jurors . . . are free to disbelieve a witness and persevere in an in-
vestigation without immunizing a perjurer.” (quoting United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411,
421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978))).
172 USAM, supra note 161 (first citation omitted).
173 See 18 U.S.C. § 912.
174 Id.
175 See id.; see also Littell v. United States, 169 F. 620, 622–23 (9th Cir. 1909) (“[If] the
gist of the offense [under this section had been] the demanding or the obtaining of money or
other thing of value of another . . . there might be doubt whether the act . . . could be made
an offense against the United States, for the reason that it has no relation to the execution of
any of the powers of Congress or to any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States; but
the gist of the offense is the . . . false impersonation, [which] . . . was made punishable at
common law, and Congress undoubtedly has the power to punish the false personation of an
officer of the United States.”).
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3. Stolen Valor Act Construed as Limiting Commercial Speech
Commercial speech traditionally has been applied to businesses engaged in vari-
ous kinds of misleading or false advertising.176 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has applied commercial speech, along with its lessened First Amendment scrutiny,
to the actions of individuals seeking economic gain from false advertising.177 This
trajectory can be expanded to include the misrepresentations regulated by the Stolen
Valor Act of 2013.
Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court found that individuals who were advertising
their professional services could engage in commercial speech.178 The application
of commercial speech to individual actors began in 1976 with Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,179 when the Court found
that a Virginia statute that limited individual pharmacists from advertising the prices
of their prescription drugs was unconstitutional because it prohibited “truthful infor-
mation about entirely lawful activity.”180 Next, the following year in 1977, the Court
extended its reasoning in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona181 by striking down a law that prohibited the ability of individual attorneys
to truthfully advertise the availability of their legal services.182
The Court’s reasoning in Bates has been reaffirmed as recently as 1995 in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.183 when the Court stated, “[i]t is now well established
that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is accorded a measure of
First Amendment protection[,]” but First Amendment protection for commercial
speech is not absolute.184 The Court went on to explain that “‘commercial speech
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that
might be impressible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’”185 Additionally,
the Court explained the framework it developed for evaluating commercial speech
cases in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,186
176 See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771–72 (1976).
178 See, e.g., id. at 770.
179 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
180 Id. at 773; see also id. at 771 (“Nor is there any claim that prescription drug price
advertisements are forbidden because they are false or misleading in any way. Untruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake. . . . Obviously,
much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or
misleading.” (citations omitted)).
181 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
182 Id. at 384.
183 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
184 Id. at 623.
185 Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
186 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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under which “the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns
unlawful activity or is misleading.”187
Moving away from commercial speech strictly in the advertising context, the
Court decided Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation.188
In Ibanez, the Court found the actions of an attorney who was displaying her qualifi-
cations of being both a Certified Public Accountant and a Certified Financial Planner
in a yellow pages listing, on her business cards, and on her office stationary, to amount
to commercial speech, despite not being traditional advertising.189 Further, because the
lawyer’s commercial speech in that case was truthful, the Court found the Florida
Board of Accountancy reprimanding the lawyer was “incompatible with First Amend-
ment restraints on official action.”190 The Court quoted In re R. M. J.191 in stating that
“[t]ruthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. . . . Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.”192
Accordingly, because the advertising in Ibanez was truthful, and the Florida Board
of Accountancy failed to prove that it was misleading or that the regulation was “no
more extensive than necessary,” the Court determined that the Respondent’s “order
reprimanding Ibanez [could not] stand.”193
When Alvarez was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court
suggested how different the analysis would have been if either party had argued that
the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 regulated commercial speech.194 Building upon this
suggestion made by the Ninth Circuit, the current Stolen Valor Act of 2013 can be
construed as constitutional because it regulates commercial speech.
An official definition or test for identifying commercial speech has not been
clearly defined.195 However, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.196 the U.S.
Supreme Court announced a three-factor test that the Court utilized in that case to
187 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623–24 (emphasis added) (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
563–64).
188 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
189 Id. at 138–39.
190 Id. at 139.
191 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
192 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 142 (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203).
193 Id. at 143 (“Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading can be restricted,
but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and materially advances a substantial
state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”).
194 617 F.3d 1198, 1206 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Of course, in the area of commercial speech,
the analysis that follows might be very different.”), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality
opinion); see Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 654 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari
in a case involving the question of whether false speech with both commercial and public
interest factors is entitled to a degree of First Amendment protection).
195 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) (“[A]mbiguities may exist at the
margins of the category of commercial speech.”(internal citations omitted)).
196 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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determine the speech at issue there was commercial speech.197 These factors were:
(1) the communication was an advertisement; (2) the speech referred to a specific
product; and (3) the speaker had an economic motivation in conveying the speech
in question.198 The Court further stated that neither the presence nor absence of any
of the three factors would be determinative of a commercial speech analysis in the
future.199 The speech criminalized by the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 falls within these
factors for commercial speech.
The first factor, that the speech be an advertisement, is the hardest factor to
apply to the speech regulated by the Stolen Valor Act. However, any one factor of
the Bolger factors is not dispositive.200 With that in mind, certain situations where
stolen valor takes place can be argued to be a form of self-promotional advertising.
For example, the misrepresentation of military awards on resumes or job applica-
tions can be done in order to “advertise” oneself as the best candidate for a particular
employment position.
The second factor, that the speech refers to a specific product, is met by the
Stolen Valor Act of 2013 as the current Act limits penalties to the misrepresentation
of being a recipient of only the highest military decorations, including the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor, distinguished-service cross for the Army, Navy cross, Air
Force Cross, silver star, Purple Heart, or combat badges.201
Finally, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 also meets the third factor that the speech
must be made with an economic motivation.202 The current Act’s requirement that
the criminalized speech must be made “with intent to obtain money, property, or
other tangible benefit,”203 illustrates that the 2013 Act is predominately targeting
those seeking economic gain.204
A balancing of these factors weighs in favor of considering the misrepresenta-
tions criminalized by the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 as commercial speech. Therefore,
because it falls within the category of commercial speech that is false or misleading,
it is constitutional to prohibit the speech entirely.205 However, as noted by the Ninth
197 Id. at 66–67.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)–(d) (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
202 Id. § 704(b).
203 Id.
204 The only stolen valor speech which can be argued to be commercial speech is the
speech seeking money or property, because the “other tangible benefit[s]” included in the
statute may be construed as non-economic and therefore, would only fall under the fraudulent
justification. An example of a non-economic yet tangible benefit that may be included in the
“other tangible benefit” could be misrepresenting the receipt of one of the requisite military
decorations in order to be elected to a voluntary board.
205 See Commercial Speech, CORNELL U.L. SCH., LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law
.cornell.edu/wex/commercial_speech [https://perma.cc/BL4E-BNUD].
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Circuit in Alvarez, a case of stolen valor qualifying as commercial speech may fall
within a category of speech the Court touched on in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky206 and de-
scribed as “a blending of commercial speech . . . and debate on an issue of public
importance.”207 In Nike, although the Court dismissed that case, the Justices reasoned
that such commercial speech intertwined with issues of public concern may be subject
to some First Amendment protection.208 This would mean the speech criminalized
by the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, if found to constitute commercial speech also
involving issues of public concern, would be subject to intermediate scrutiny be-
cause that is the relevant First Amendment standard of review for commercial speech
that is not completely false.209 In order for a statute to pass intermediate scrutiny, the
statute must “further an important government interest by means that are substan-
tially related to that interest.”210 The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 should survive an
intermediate scrutiny review because: (1) as conceded by both the Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court, the government’s purpose for the Act—protecting the integrity of
the nation’s highest military awards while also safeguarding the valor and honor of
true war heroes—reaches the even higher standard of being a compelling purpose;211
and (2) the 2013 Act is substantially related to the government’s interest in safe-
guarding the integrity of the military awards system, as it narrowly criminalizes only
misrepresentations of receipt of a limited number of the highest awards that are
made with the intent to obtain “money, property, or other tangible benefit.”212
B. Although Constitutional, the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 Is Unenforced
Although the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is constitutional, only two arrests and
prosecutions have been made for false representation under the new Act since its
enactment.213 This is further illustrated by the fact that Sean Yetman, a military
impersonator who garnered over five million YouTube video views for his blatant
206 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam).
207 Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
208 Id. at 656–65.
209 Commercial Speech, supra note 205.
210 Intermediate Scrutiny, CORNELL U.L. SCH., LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/GK4M-PT7M].
211 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The Gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question. But
to recite the Government’s compelling interests is not to end the matter.” (emphasis added));
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (“Especially at a time in which our nation is engaged in the longest war
in its history, Congress certainly has an interest, even a compelling interest, in preserving the
integrity of its system of honoring our military men and women for their service and, at
times, their sacrifice.” (emphasis added)).
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (Supp. I 2013).
213 See Kellogg, supra note 28; Mara, supra note 28.
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fraudulent misrepresentation of an Army Ranger,214 has not been investigated or
prosecuted by authorities, and it has been over two years since the actions leading
to his notorious video occurred. Even though there is a constitutional federal law
criminalizing the fraudulent misrepresentation of earning high military honors that
has been in place since June of 2013, not even the most flagrant violations of this
Act have been prosecuted.215 The fact that the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 has been
essentially unenforced is leading to several problems: (1) veterans are left to police
this situation virtually by themselves,216 which can, at times, lead to violence and
confrontations of individuals who are not actually engaging in stolen valor;217 and
(2) states are now, at increasing rates, enacting broader and harsher stolen valor laws
with stronger penalties than the federal version, in a desperate attempt to see this
behavior adequately criminalized and prosecuted.218
1. Public Shaming and Vigilante Justice Are Not Adequate Enforcement
Mechanisms
In United States v. Alvarez, Justice Kennedy seemed to advocate for the use of
public shaming through the use of social media and “counterspeech” by veterans as
an adequate remedy to the problem of stolen valor.219 Kennedy conveyed this point
by asserting that “[the government] has not shown, and cannot show, why counter-
speech, such as the ridicule respondent received online and in the press, would not
suffice to achieve its interest.”220
First and foremost, the government’s primary interest in having a law proscrib-
ing the misrepresentation of military awards for extraordinary valor is to defend the
legitimacy of these awards and to ensure that the true war hero award recipients are
properly honored and respected.221 This goal cannot be advanced by the countless
videos the public is exposed to on both social media and the ones that garner so
214 Stolen Valor, supra note 13.
215 See Kathryn Watson, Here’s Why Stolen Valor Gets Ignored, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 28,
2017), http://dailycaller.com/2017/01/28/heres-why-stolen-valor-goes-ignored/ [https://perma
.cc/6BBB-JGZD].
216 See, e.g., Michael J. Gaynor, If You’re Lying About Being a Navy SEAL, This Man Will
Catch You, WASHINGTONIAN (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people
/if-youre-lying-about-being-a-navy-seal-veteran-don-shipley-will-catch-you/ [https://perma
.cc/FB35-6B5B] (“When I asked an FBI representative how many Stolen Valor cases it has
worked, I was told the numbers ‘are not readily available.’ That means the only sanction
some fakers will face is Shipley’s vigilante justice.” (emphasis added)).
217 See supra notes 13–22 and accompanying text; infra notes 222–27 and accompanying text.
218 Perry Chiaramonte, Above and Beyond: 2 States Craft ‘Stolen Valor’ Laws that Exceed
Federal Version, FOX NEWS (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/03/21/above
-and-beyond-2-states-craft-stolen-valor-laws-that-exceed-federal-version/ [https://perma.cc
/C68Q-LGZG] [hereinafter Above and Beyond]; see supra Section I.E.
219 See 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2540 (2012) (plurality opinion).
220 Id.
221 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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many views that they are covered by large media outlets because the more stories
the public hears of imposters of these awards, the more likely it is that civilians will
generally doubt the claims of an actual recipient. Second, further evidence of the
inadequacy of Kennedy’s assertion is that as of now, five years after Alvarez was
decided, the vigilante pursuit of military imposters has devolved into instances of
assault and public humiliation as a result of false accusations.222
Recently, incidents of assault resulting from false accusations of stolen valor
have been increasing. This is inevitable when the task of policing stolen valor is
placed in the hands of citizens to monitor and expose the frauds by themselves. For
example, on November 19, 2015, a sixty-six-year-old Vietnam veteran who had
been previously awarded a Purple Heart for his service, was attacked and physically
assaulted at an airport as a result of a case of mistaken stolen valor.223 Jack Hughes,
United States Marine veteran, described this confrontation at the Charlotte, North
Carolina airport, in his own words:
“All of a sudden (a man) jumps up and he’s got a camera in my
face screaming, ‘Your medals are crooked. You’re a fake. You’re
not a Marine’ . . . . He kept screaming at me, telling me I was noth-
ing, that everything I had was fake. I was a fake and phony.”224
This incident induced Hughes to have flashbacks to when he returned home from
Vietnam in the 1960s when servicemen received a “less than welcoming return.”225
These incidents are happening more often, and the injuries resulting from the
false stolen valor encounters are also increasing in severity. Over the weekend of
October 24, 2015, Michael Delfin, a marine combat veteran who served for over
twelve years in the Marine Corps was attacked and brutally assaulted at a bar in Cali-
fornia after an airman accused him of stolen valor and later ambushed Delfin in the
parking lot.226 Delfin suffered a broken tibia and a fractured jaw.227
222 Stephen Bajza, Unstolen Valor! Bolden Was a Marine, UNDER RADAR (July 30, 2014),
http://undertheradar.military.com/2014/07/unstolen-valor-bolden-was-a-marine/ [https://perma
.cc/6YWT-YF7K] (detailing the story of a seventy-seven-year-old marine veteran diagnosed
with dementia who was confronted and humiliated for false stolen valor accusations); Man
Pretending to Be a Navy SEAL, supra note 30; The Problem with Calling Out, supra note 31.
223 Coleen Harry, Vietnam Vet Says Men Assaulted Him Over Medals at Charlotte Airport,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/com
munity/news-alliance/wbtv-news/article45454578.html [https://perma.cc/P6ZP-LCYD].
224 Id. (quoting Vietnam veteran, Jack Hughes).
225 Id.
226 Suzanne Phan, Combat Veteran Wrongly Accused of ‘Stolen Valor’ Attacked; Suspects
Still on the Loose, ABC10 (Oct. 29, 2015 7:40 PM), http://sacramento.abc10.com/news/news
/524941-combat-veteran-wrongly-accused-stolen-valor-attacked-suspects-still-loose [https://
perma.cc/FG5K-JX2H]; Marine Veteran Beaten, supra note 30.
227 Phan, supra note 226.
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These incidents illustrate that the counterspeech initially suggested to be an ade-
quate solution to the epidemic of stolen valor is not as effective as it was predicted to
be. Just one incident of a veteran being attacked and humiliated after contributing
years of service, and even possibly engaging in combat, is one incident too many.
III. SOLUTIONS: TO INCREASE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE STOLEN VALOR ACT OF
2013, THE ACT CAN BE AMENDED TO MIRROR 18 U.S.C. § 912 OR IT CAN BE
REDRAFTED TO MODEL A STRONGER STATE-LEVEL STOLEN VALOR LAW
A. Amend the Act to Address the Dichotomy Between Impersonating a Police
Officer and Impersonating a War Hero
One potential solution to the problem of the lack of enforcement of the Stolen
Valor Act of 2013 is to amend the Act and model it after a federal act that criminalizes
similar behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 912 criminalizes police impersonation and is both
constitutional and enforced much more frequently than the Stolen Valor Act.228
The case of United States v. Chappell229 illustrates this dichotomy.230 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided this case only one month after the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 in Alvarez for being overbroad and
violating the First Amendment.231 In Chappell, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
Virginia Code section 18.2-174 violated the First Amendment by analyzing the text
of the statute which reads, “Any person who falsely assumes or exercise the func-
tions, powers, duties, and privileges incident to the office of sheriff, police officer,
marshal, or other peace officer . . . or who falsely assumes or pretends to be any
such officer, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”232 The Fourth Circuit upheld the
statute and reasoned that “[f]alsely identifying oneself as a policeman in order to get
out of a speeding ticket is simply not the kind of expressive conduct the Framers of
our first and one of our greatest amendments had in mind.”233
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Chappell from Alvarez by adopting an over-
breadth analysis suggested by the dissent in Alvarez, and by arguing that because the
Court in Alvarez
recognized . . . the general validity of laws prohibiting “the false
representation that one is speaking as a Government official or
on behalf of the Government.” Indeed, each of the Court’s opin-
ions expressly confirmed the constitutionality of a law bearing
228 See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.
229 691 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 965 (2013).
230 Id. at 400.
231 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion).
232 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-174 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
233 Chappell, 691 F.3d at 400.
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striking similarities to the one before us: 18 U.S.C. § 912, the
federal statute prohibiting impersonation of government officers.234
In other words, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Chappell because it dealt with a
statute that criminalized police impersonation as opposed to military impersonation.235
However, as stated by Judge Wynn in his dissent in Chappell,
This case involves a content-based restriction on speech—
namely, false claims of being a police officer. Just a few weeks
ago, the Supreme Court addressed the very question of whether
false statements, generally, are afforded First Amendment protec-
tion and ‘reject[ed] the notion that false speech should be in a
general category that is presumptively unprotected.’ A straightfor-
ward application of Alvarez’s analysis and holding compels the
invalidation of the challenged provision at issue in this case.236
This precedent establishes that speech is unprotected by the First Amendment when
an individual merely falsely represents themselves as a police officer, yet, it is only un-
protected by the First Amendment for an individual to falsely represent themselves as
a war hero when that individual both misrepresents receipt of one of the requisite
awards and does so with the intention of economic or tangible gain. The fact that the
government has to prove these additional elements in the realm of military imper-
sonation may add to the difficulty of prosecution, and subsequent conviction, of
stolen valor offenders.
A possible solution to this dichotomy would be to either merge the Stolen Valor
Act of 2013 with 18 U.S.C. § 912 or to redraft the Stolen Valor Act to mirror the
broader scope of § 912. First, an example of how the two Acts could merge would be
to add an additional paragraph to § 912 specifying the criminalization of military
impersonation, while keeping the same elements of proof required for police imperson-
ation. Second, the Stolen Valor Act could be redrafted to encompass both the mere
impersonation of a military member (either active duty or retired) and the imperson-
ation of being a distinguished medal recipient, much like § 912. Section 912 serves as
a good model for a broader Stolen Valor Act because: it criminalizes similar imper-
sonation behavior, and it carries a higher penalty (up to three years imprisonment
versus one year);237 it is more frequently enforced (at least seven ongoing cases for
234 Id. (footnote omitted) (first quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545–46; then citing id.
at 2546–47; id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2561–62 (Alito,
J., dissenting)).
235 Id. at 397.
236 Id. at 400 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546–47 (plurality
opinion)).
237 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012).
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violations of § 912 in 2015 alone);238 and as “the Supreme Court has said so in
Alvarez itself: all nine [J]ustices affirmed that the federal officer impersonation stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 912, is constitutional.”239
B. States as Laboratories of Experimentation
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis created the phrase that states are “labora-
tories of democracy”240 for his notion that states can more easily “try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”241 In other words,
states are in a better position to test, or experiment with, the enforcement of laws
than is the federal government. It is possible that the federal Stolen Valor Act is
remaining unenforced so the states will have a chance to enact their own variations
of the Act and to allow the federal government to access how states adjudicate and
prosecute cases of stolen valor. If a state happens to come up with a successful solu-
tion to the problem of stolen valor, the federal Stolen Valor Act may be amended to
mimic the more successful variation.
New Jersey and Massachusetts serve as examples of how states can pass their
own variations of federal laws that are both broader and provide for tougher penal-
ties than the federal Act.
1. New Jersey Stolen Valor Act: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 38A:14-5
Members of the New Jersey legislature were inspired after watching the viral
YouTube video of Sean Yetman “in full military uniform at the Oxford Valley Mall
in Bucks County, Pa. asking for money” who was later exposed as never having
served in the military, yet was never prosecuted for his fraudulent activity.242 As a
result, on October 26, 2015, New Jersey enacted a stolen valor law that encompasses
a broader scope of behavior and imposes harsher penalties than the federal law.243
238 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Schnetzka, 629 F. App’x 422 (3d Cir. 2015); United
States v. Thetford, 806 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 187 (2016); United
States v. McCulley, 605 F. App’x 658 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Barros-Villahermosa, 91
F. Supp. 3d 261 (D.P.R. 2015); United States v. Colvard, No. 1:13-CR-109, 2015 WL 5123893
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2015); Commonwealth v. Widberg, No. 14-P-891, 2015 WL 5009275
(Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015); Cornwell v. State, 471 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
239 Chappell, 691 F.3d at 394 (quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546–47; id. at 2554 (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2561–62 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
240 Reihan Salam, ‘Laboratories of Democracy’ and What Works Where, NAT’L REV.
(Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/343218/laboratories-democracy
-and-what-works-where-reihan-salam [https://perma.cc/7V83-SRK7].
241 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
242 Dan Alexander, Stolen Valor Law: It’s Now a Crime to Impersonate Military in NJ
(Oct. 27, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://nj1015.com/stolen-valor-law-its-now-a-crime-to-imper
sonate-military-in-nj/ [https://perma.cc/JX74-5XVJ].
243 Above and Beyond, supra note 218.
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The New Jersey Stolen Valor law criminalizes the actions of “[a]ny person who
knowingly, with intent to impersonate and with intent to deceive, misrepresents one-
self” as either an active duty member or a veteran of any of the branches of U.S. Armed
Forces by: (1) “wearing the uniform or any medal or insignia authorized for use by
the members or veterans of the United States Armed Forces” alone;244 (2) subsection
(1) combined with the “purpose of obtaining money, property, or other tangible
benefit”;245 or (3) subsection (1) combined with “the purpose of obtaining money,
property, or other tangible benefit” in conjunction with “hold[ing] oneself out to be
a recipient of any decoration or medal created by Federal and State laws and regu-
lations to honor the members or veterans of the United States Armed Forces or the
organized militia.”246 Subsection (1) is considered to be a crime of the fourth degree,
while subsections (2) and (3) are deemed to be crimes of the third degree, which are
additionally “subject to a minimum fine of $1,000.”247
Additionally, one of the best features of New Jersey’s stolen valor legislation is
that all of the money collected from the stolen valor fines will go into the “Military
Dependents Scholarship Fund” that will provide college scholarships to both spouses
and children of services members who have been killed, gone missing, or become
disabled during “Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, or Operation New Dawn.”248
While signing this bill into law, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that,
by passing this Stolen Valor Act, in addition to creating the military dependents schol-
arship, and a law aiding businesses owned by disabled veterans, “we are not only
reaffirming a pledge to those who serve, we are providing important opportunities
for educational access and business development, and upholding the integrity and
dignity of their service by punishing those who misrepresent themselves as serving
in the military.”249
What distinguishes New Jersey’s Stolen Valor Act from the federal Stolen Valor
Act of 2013 is the severity of the penalty, the destination of the fines, and the scope
of behavior criminalized by the law. In New Jersey, a third degree offense can lead
to the offender receiving a three- to five-year prison term along with a mandatory
$1,000 fine.250 In contrast, the federal Act imposes a maximum penalty of a fine of
an unspecified amount or imprisonment of one year, or both.251 All fines collected
under the New Jersey law go directly into a fund to help the families of actual veterans
who have suffered debilitating injury or loss of their lives in combat.252 Whereas the
244 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:14-5 (West 2016).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Alexander, supra note 242.
249 Id.
250 § 38A:14-5.
251 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I 2013).
252 See Alexander, supra note 242.
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federal Act does not specify where the fines will go, it is likely the fines will go to the
U.S. Treasury Department.253 Finally, the New Jersey Stolen Valor Act separately
criminalizes (1) the wearing of any official uniform, medal, or insignia of the armed
forces; and (2) the wearing of a uniform, medal, or insignia with the “intent to
deceive for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or other tangible benefit.”254
This allows the state to prosecute more offenders than the federal Act, which is
limited in scope to only offenders wearing specified medals with the intent to obtain
money, property, or another tangible benefit.255
Impressively, less than a month after enacting the state’s Stolen Valor Act into
law, New Jersey had already arrested and charged its first stolen valor offender.256
This draws a sharp contrast to the lack of enforcement of the federal Stolen Valor
Act of 2013, which has been effective since June 3, 2013. Four years later there have
only been two fraudulent representation arrests under the law.257 Michael Porter is
a twenty-five-year-old New Jersey resident who was arrested for impersonating a
solider on Veterans Day, November 11, 2015, and is the first to be arrested and
charged under New Jersey’s stolen valor law.258 Following his arrest, “[a] judge sent
Porter to county jail in lieu of $5,000 bail.”259
2. Massachusetts Stolen Valor Act: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 106
Similar to New Jersey’s Stolen Valor Act, Massachusetts’s Stolen Valor Act
criminalizes a broader scope of misrepresentation than the federal Stolen Valor Act
of 2013.260 The Massachusetts act criminalizes: (1) the fraudulent misrepresentation
of oneself as a member of the armed forces by manufacturing, selling, using, or wearing
253 Lynn Stuart Parramore, When Giant Banks Pay Fines, Where Does the Money Go?
Does It Stop Crime?, ALTERNET (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/economy/bank-fines
-and-crime [https://perma.cc/HK7Z-H87C] (“[A] former [Department of Justice] officer,
Billy Jacobson, has gone on record as saying that the fines . . . go the [sic] U.S. Treasury.
Restitution for victims is rare, and constitutes a trivial amount of what the DOJ brings in.”);
see also USAM, supra note 161, at tit. 12.3-12000, http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-3
-12000-collection-criminal-monetary-impositions [https://perma.cc/Z5TT-MATC] (listing
the fines themselves, but not specifying the fines’ ultimate destination).
254 § 38A:14-5.
255 18 U.S.C. § 704.
256 See NJ Impersonation, supra note 36.
257 Above and Beyond, supra note 218 (“[T]here have been no arrests under the [current]
federal law.”).
258 See NJ Impersonation, supra note 36.
259 Dan Stamm, Stolen Valor: Police Bust New Jersey Man for Impersonating a Soldier on
Veterans Day, NBC10 (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:17 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local
/Stolen-Valor-Arrest-Galloway-Porter-346592602.html [https://perma.cc/J62X-GZLQ] [herein-
after Police Bust NJ Man].
260 See Tiffany Chan, ‘Stolen Valor’ Bill Signed Preventing Veteran Impersonation, 22NEWS
WWLP.COM (Nov. 23, 2015, 5:55 PM), http://wwlp.com/2015/11/23/stolen-valor-bill-signed
-preventing-veteran-impersonation/ [https://perma.cc/95K3-7D2L].
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a uniform or using a fake military identification; and (2) fraudulent misrepresentation
of oneself as a recipient of the same high honors criminalized by the federal Act.261
The Massachusetts Stolen Valor law differs from the federal Stolen Valor Act
in scope of behavior criminalized by expanding the scope to include the mere using
or wearing a uniform or using a fake military identification.262 Additionally, another
difference is that the Massachusetts law requires that the offender actually “obtains
money, property or another tangible benefit through such fraudulent representation.”263
Whereas, the federal Stolen Valor Act requires the individual to misrepresent themself
with the “intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.”264 Further, the
Massachusetts legislation carries a penalty of imprisonment of a maximum of one year,
“a fine of $1,000, or both.”265 These penalties are similar to the federal Act’s penalty of
a fine of an unspecified amount, or imprisonment of not more than a year, or both.266
3. New Jersey’s and Massachusetts’ Tough Stolen Valor Laws Are Constitutional
As discussed above, fraud statutes are generally thought to include the following
elements of the common law tort of fraud: (1) a speaker made a false statement of
material fact knowing it was false; (2) the speaker intended the statement to mislead;
and (3) the false statement did in fact mislead or deceive.267 However, the Stolen
Valor Act of 2013 and, by extension, the state laws mirrored after it, most closely
resemble impersonation statutes similar to the federal criminal impersonation statute
discussed above, 18 U.S.C. § 912.268 As delineated above, 18 U.S.C. § 912 encom-
passes two offenses: (1) “impersonation coupled with acting as such” and (2) “imper-
sonation coupled with demanding or obtaining something of value in such pretended
character.”269 Additionally, an element of both offenses is the “[f]alse personation
of an officer or employee of the United States.”270 Most applicable to the laws crimi-
nalizing stolen valor is the second of these two offenses, which contains two elements:
(1) “falsely assum[ing] or pretend[ing] to be an officer or employee acting under the
authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof[;]” and
(2) “in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document,
or thing of value.”271
261 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 106 (West 2016).
262 Id.
263 Id. (emphasis added).
264 Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I).
265 ch. 272, § 106.
266 18 U.S.C. § 704.
267 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM, supra note
152, § 9; see also supra Section II.A.
268 See 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012); see also supra notes 148–66 and accompanying text.
269 Criminal Resource Manual, in USAM, supra note 161, § 1470.
270 Id.
271 18 U.S.C. § 912.
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The New Jersey Stolen Valor Act fulfills the first element of a constitutionally
valid impersonation statute by requiring the offender to intentionally and falsely
“misrepresent[] oneself as a member or veteran of the United States Armed Forces.”272
The second element is satisfied through the statute’s second and third subsections
that require the offender to impersonate either an active duty member or veteran of
the armed forces “for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or other tangible
benefit.”273 However, it may be argued that New Jersey’s Stolen Valor Act’s first
subsection, which criminalizes the knowing misrepresentation of a veteran or active
duty military member through the wearing of an authorized uniform or medal, does
not pass constitutional muster, as it does not fulfill the second element of the false
personation statute, requiring that the person demand or obtain “money, paper, docu-
ment, or thing of value.”274 This opposition to New Jersey’s Stolen Valor Act would
be unsuccessful because this may fall under § 912’s “acts as such” crime because
“action alone” can constitute a completed violation of § 912.275 Further, there is current
federal law prohibiting the unauthorized wearing of a military uniform, 18 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2012),276 that the Supreme Court has held is “a valid statute on its face.”277
The Massachusetts Stolen Valor Law satisfies the first element of a constitution-
ally valid false personation statute, which requires an individual to falsely assume or
pretend to be an officer or employee of the United States.278 The Massachusetts law
does this by requiring that a person “fraudulently represents [himself or herself] to
be an active member or veteran of” the armed forces or “fraudulently represents
[himself or herself] to be a recipient of” the same medals qualified in the Stolen Valor
Act of 2013.279 The second element, which requires that “in such pretend character,
[the offender] demand[] or obtain[] any money, paper, document, or thing of value,”280
is satisfied by the requirement that the offender engage in these misrepresentations
purposefully and “with the intent to obtain money, property or any other tangible
benefit.”281 Additionally, although not required for constitutional validity, the
272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:14-5 (West 2016).
273 Id.
274 18 U.S.C. § 912.
275 USAM, supra note 161 (“Thus action alone may amount to a false pretense of federal
authority.” (citing Heskett v. United States, 58 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1932))).
276 18 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“Whoever, in any place within the jurisdiction of the United
States or in the Canal Zone, without authority, wears the uniform or a distinctive part thereof or
anything similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of any of the armed forces of the United
States, . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”).
277 Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970) (“18 U.S.C. § 702, making it an offense
to wear our military uniforms without authority is, standing alone, a valid statute on its face.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
278 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 106 (West 2016).
279 Id.
280 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012).
281 ch. 272, § 106.
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Massachusetts Stolen Valor Law satisfies the traditional common-law fraud ele-
ments of actual reliance and injury.282 The Massachusetts Stolen Valor Act does this
by requiring that an offender must misrepresent themself as either an active member
of the armed forces or a recipient of an honorable distinction from the armed forces,
in addition to the requirement that they must “obtain[ ] money, property or another
tangible benefit through such fraudulent representation.”283
Thus, both New Jersey’s and Massachusetts’ stolen valor acts are constitutional
when construed as false personation statutes limiting fraudulent speech and conduct.
Additionally, New Jersey’s Stolen Valor Act appears to be more easily enforceable,
as the state is already prosecuting its first offender.284 Either of these variations on
the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013 provides positive examples of ways Congress
could amend the federal Act to criminalize a broader range of fraudulent stolen valor
conduct and potentially impose harsher sentences.
CONCLUSION
The United States of America has a longstanding tradition of both honoring our
nation’s heroes through medals of valor and protecting that award system through
legislation. This tradition traces back to Framer of the U.S. Constitution, “George
Washington, as the commander of the Continental Army, [who] created the very first
‘honorary badges of distinction’ for service in our country’s military.”285 In doing so,
Washington “established a rigorous system to ensure that these awards would be
received and worn by only the truly deserving.”286 Washington required that “‘incon-
testable proof’ of ‘singularly meritorious action’ [be presented] to the Commander
in Chief” before a badge of distinction would be issued, and he ordered that “anyone
with the ‘insolence to assume’ a badge that had not actually been earned would be
‘severely punished.’”287
This tradition has been continued through the passage of the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005 and the amendment of that Act to create the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 to
ensure that this country continued to constitutionally criminalize the egregious imper-
sonation of war heroes for personal gain.288 The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is constitu-
tional under two separate interpretations: (1) as a statute that criminalizes fraudulent
speech and conduct; and (2) as a statute that criminalizes a form of individualized
282 See id.
283 Id. § 106(a)(ii) (emphasis added) (delineating the protected medals).
284 Police Bust NJ Man, supra note 259.
285 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2557 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
286 Id.
287 Id. at 2557–58 (citation omitted).
288 See Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (including com-
mentary on previous iterations of the Stolen Valor Act, such as the 2005 version).
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commercial speech. The Act is constitutional under either interpretation because fraud
has been a “historically unprotected”289 category of speech, and “the government may
freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.”290
Despite the enactment of a constitutional Stolen Valor Act, the federal govern-
ment has only prosecuted two offenders for fraudulent representation under this Act
since its enactment in 2013.291 This has led to a vigilante atmosphere where veterans
have been left to police these impersonations on their own, and where states are
pushing for their own legislation to actively combat these relentless threats to the
legitimacy of the nation’s honors for “only the bravest of the brave.”292 Evaluation
of the enforcement of stolen valor legislation is crucial at this time because stolen
valor encounters between veterans and imposters are turning increasingly violent,
leading to extensive injuries, including broken jaws. Furthermore, instances of false
stolen valor accusations are occurring and leading to the humiliation of veterans who
have honorably served and survived combat.293
There are two solutions for the current lack of federal enforcement of the con-
stitutional Stolen Valor Act of 2013: (1) amend the Stolen Valor Act of 2013 to more
closely mirror the federal criminal impersonation statute used to prosecute police
impersonation, 18 U.S.C. § 912; or (2) continue to watch the development of suc-
cessful and constitutional state stolen valor laws and redraft the Stolen Valor Act of
2013 after the one that best combats stolen valor. 
As a nation, we owe it to our war heroes to continue to follow George Washing-
ton’s guidance and “guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism.”294
289 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470, 472 (2010).
290 Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980)).
291 See Mara, supra note 28.
292 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting).
293 See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text.
294 George Washington’s Farewell Address, FRONTIERS FREEDOM (Jan. 7, 2013), https://ff
.org/george-washingtons-farewell-address/ [https://perma.cc/S8EB-236Z] (presenting George
Washington’s address on September 19, 1796).
